Priority of Response: Levinas and the Phenomenology of the Third Party

Abstract

The third party, in a general sense, often carries a negative implication. It is associated with conflict, injustice, broken relationships, and other disturbances to the direct I-Other relationship. In contrast, within Levinas’s ethical framework, the concept of the third party acquires a complex and positive ethical dimension that reconfigures the I-Other relationship. This paper examines the socio-ethical connection between the Other and the “other Others,” which Levinas refers to as the “third party,” and explores why the concept of the third party in Levinas’s ethical philosophy carries a positive meaning. It investigates how the third party leads to justice itself and examines various interpretations of Levinas’s notion of the third party. Consequently, this paper seeks to extend and elaborate on the interpretation of Levinas’s asymmetrical I-Other relation by examining his notion and discussion of the third party in his ethical thought. This paper contends that Levinas’s treatment of the ethical relationship between the primary Other and secondary Others—what he terms the “third party”—remains underdeveloped. Specifically, Levinas does not clarify whether the Other holds a higher ethical ground over the other Others, who also demand justice and compel us to respond.