Natural Law, Metaphysics, and the Creator: Natural law as the laws of physics

Abstract

If reductionism is rejected, as the work I have canvassed argues it should be, then with respect to this one issue the Thomistic worldview is more veridical and more worthy of acceptance than SSP is. By itself, of course, this conclusion certainly does not decide the issue as regards the central disagreement between SSP and the Thomistic view. It cannot adjudicate the issue regarding the ultimate foundation of reality. And so, as far as the evidence canvassed in this paper is concerned, the central disagreement between SSP and the Thomistic view remains an open issue. Clearly, it is possible to reject reductionism and accept atheism. For that matter, it is possible to reject atheism and accept reductionism. As I have described it, SSP is a secular view that combines contemporary scientific theories with certain metaphysical claims. But it is possible to have an analogue to SSP in which a reductionist scientific view of the world is combined with a commitment to religious belief, even religious belief of an orthodox Christian sort. That is, SSP can have a theistic analogue, which includes most of the scientific and metaphysical worldview of SSP but marries it to belief in an immaterial Creator. So, for example, consider Peter van Inwagen’s explanation of God’s providence. Trying to explain God's actions in the created world, Van Inwagen says that God acts by issuing decrees about elementary particles and their causal powers: "[God’s] action consists in His … issuing a decree." The point is rather this: the rejection of reductionism leaves room for the place ordinary intuition accords persons in the world. But, to me at any rate, the metaphysics that gives persons this place is more readily intelligible on a worldview that sees persons as the ultimate foundation of reality. Figuring out how to make it cohere with the picture Blackburn paints, even if we subtract reductionism from that picture, strikes me as harder to do.